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'lliE EVOLUl'ION OF JAPAN'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE INr.ERWAR
 PERIOD 
I. Introduction* · 
'Ihe role of finance in Japan's econan1c development is a fa
scinating, 
if not fully understood, phenorenon.
l In the interwar period there was a 
nowering of the nxxiern financial system concondtant with t
he overall 
process of industrial development and diversification. Th
is paper first 
reviews the broad evolution of Japan's financial system f'ra
n the en:i of 
World War I until the beginning of its profound transforma
tion in the 
late 1930s as war-related direct controls arxi centralizatio
n were in:posed. 
The second part proVides a mre detailed examination of th
e financing of 
corporate business , in particular the sources and uses of 
funds in the 
m1d-l930s for the Mitsubishi zaibatsu first-line and secon
d-line indus­
trial. and cormErcial enterprises as a case study. Ma.in err
;,ha.sis is upon 
the second-line subsidiaries, whose funding has not been c
onsidered pre­
viously in ruch detail, utilizing the Allied Occupation (SCA
P) Zaibatsu 
files 1n the United States NatioP.al Arc.bives = 
II. The Interwar Financial System: An Overview 
In roost respects the basic features and even the structure
 of the 
financial system in the period 1920-1937 were determined b
y its earlier 
So too were the various problems in financial structuredeveloµnent. 
In this section we briefly con­that became apparent during the period. 
sider the heritage, the growth an:i diversification of the 
financial 
system, the very substantial changes in coornercial banking
 structure, 
and the issue of financial dualism. 
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By 1905 or so., Japan's roodern financial. system., centered on the 
banking system, was well 1n place-in tenns of the basic rules of the 
game, the institutional. structure, the development of deposit banldng, 
and the substantial degree of integratiai of financial markets (Teranishi 
and Patrick, 1978) . 'Ihe m::>st important rule, to prevail W1til the late 
1930s, was that interest rates 1n principle were detenn:1.ned by supply 
and demand in a coopetitive marketplace; this was the case for virtually 
all financial claims, ranging fran bon:is arrl loans even to rates.on time 
and saving deposits. While the initial establishment of the banking 
system had been subsidized by various fornis of government credit, by the 
end of Meiji this had becane relatively l.lIU.IIi)Ortant. The financial sys­
ten was able to exist and thrive on the basis of market demand for its 
services. According, "dernand.-following11 , market-oriented financial 
development was a major feature of the interwar pericxi (Patrick, 1966). 
Entry into banking had ~een very easy, resulting 1n a large number 
of camercial banks, sorre 1867 at its peak in 1901. Banks ranged tre­
neooously in size, from tiny 11dwarf" banks to such 1mnense banks as the 
Firtee.'1th, I41tsui, rai-icl".t, a.Ai Yasuda. r~r-eover, tt-ie over-a.11 f:L-KU-i-
cial structure had been established well prior to World War I. Japan 
had comnercial banks, savings banks, a central bank, long-tenn credit 
banks, life and non-life insurance canpanies, a small but active capital 
market in bon:is and equities, and attendant securities corrpanies an:i 
other institutions. 
'lbe World War I boom was an :1rnportant force in the shaping of 
2Japan's interwar industrial and financial structure. In particular 
many well-established large firnis made such substantial profits that 
they no longer needed nuch external long-term or short-term credit. 
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Others, especially those established during World War I, were not yet 
sufficiently canpetitive relative to imports, a problem exacerbated by 
Japan emanating frcm World War I with a price level sanewhat above the 
maJor industrial nations. Financial institutions, large as well as 
small, were subject to s1mi]ar disparities 1n performance in the 1920s 
as a consequence of differential growth arx:l growth strategies during 
the war period. 
Growth arx:l Diversification of the Financial System 
In looking at the interwar period as an entire period, the mst 
striking features are rapid financial growth, increasing diversification 
am:>ng types of financial institutions, and substantial reduction. . in the 
number of banks. In Goldsmith's macro reasurem=nts, 
''I'he decade [of the 1920s] witnessed one of the IIDst inten­
sive phases in the growth of the fj.nancial system compared 
to national wealth ani income, the ratio of financial assets 
to gross national product rising... from just over three in 
1920 to five-and-one half in 1930. fran about 3-3 to 5.4 
with stocks at market value" (Goldsmith 1972, ch. N, pp. 77-78). 
In the 1930s the eA-pai.,sion of fir.a.~cial assets kept approY.i~tely iD 
step with that of national product, the ratio remaining in the neighbor­
hOOd of five-and-one half (Goldsmith 1972, ch. V, p. 79). Between 1918 
and 1938 not surprisingly the ratio of xooney supply(~) to GNP increased 
only slightly while the m::>re broadly defined M,JGNP ratio, i."1cluding time 
t:. 
arxl savings deposits, rose rapidly (Fujino and Teranishi, 1975, pp. 338-9) . 
For the interwar period as a woole the government sector, the foreign 
sector, arxi the business sector were in deficit. The deficit of the 
govemnent, particularly pronounced in the 1930s, was financed through 
the issuance of government borxis, while that of the foreign sector was 
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matched by the decrease 1n fore~ currency reserves which had been ac­
cuuuJated during World War I. Althoogh the corporate sector was 1n 
deficit its retained earnings were relatively large. 'Ihl.s sector ob­
tained outside fuoos both thra.lgh notation of stocks and bonds, espe- · 
cially in the 1920s, as well as borrowings frcm financial intennediaries. 
'lbe household sector was, of course, a surplus sector; it held its assets 
1n the fonn of deposits as well as bonds and stocks. 
'lbe increasing diversificatiai of the financial system is shown in 
Table l Table 1. D.1ring the 1nterwar period, growth is particularly rapid in 
here 
the loanable funds am hence loans and investments of financial institu­
tions for agriculture an::l small business, trust companies, the Postal 
savings and Deposit Bureau, and life insurance companies. Accord1ngly 
the relative share of the carmercial banks as a whole decreased sharply, 
but the share of the "large" banks increased, greatly relative to local 
banks but even relative to the f1nancial system as a whole by 1940. 3 
'Ibe five special banks for long-tenn credit were of considerable 
inportance. They floated their own bonds as the ma1n source of funds, 
as well as serving as a conduit for government furxis. While privately­
owned, profit-maximizing institutions, they were subject to consider­
able government influence. Trust corrpanies and insurance companies, 
. 
while growing, had a smaller market share. Although postal savings pro-
vided the basis for substantial government financial intennediation, its 
funds were mainly directed to the central and local governnents and to 
social overhead investment (through the special banks and local m.micipal­
ities). 
·'Ihe stock market continued to expand during the 1920s. In addition, 
the Japanese bond market developed particularly strongly during the 1920s 
-5-
and 1930s. While the central government continued to be an important 
borrower, local governments, special banks, and large industrial corpor­
ations (especially electric power cOD;)allies) relied increasingly on new 
borKi issues in a free, coopetitive capital market (Shimura, 1969). 
. Concentration in the Ccmnercial Banking Structure 
'1he increasing concentration within the banking system during the 
1nterwar period is an :inportant topic which has received considerable 
attention. 'Ihe figures are stark.4 Japan had 2,001 ordinary and savings 
banks in 1919; by 1929 this had declined to 976, and by 1939 to 389. New 
banks were established throughout, 244 1n the first ten-year period am. 
69 in the second. However, there were substantially IIDre bank failures, 
34ti ani 328 in the respective subperiods. There were even more mergers, 
ti38 and 438, typically aioong small banks many often on the verge of 
bankruptcy., rather than with the Big Five (Dai-ichi, Sumitano., Yasuda, 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi) or other large banks. The one exception was the 
emergence of the Sanwa Bank in 1933 as an am3]garnation of three medium­
sized Kansai banks., thereby changing the Big Five to the Big Six. 
'lhe overall growth of the financial system masks the tremendous., 
recurrent turbulence to which the financial system was subjected during 
the interwar period, turbulence reflected in the 81 percent decline 1n 
the number of banks. There were two basic causes at work: structural 
defects of the banking system itself; an:i a series of external events 
and random shocks which subjected the banking system to one crisis after 
another. 
'Ihe large number of small banks, operating 1n markets limited geo­
graphically and hence 1n diversification of borrowers by industry., without 
-6-
serious constraints en proportion of loans to a few borrowers, without 
depositor insurance or other forms of depositor protection, an:i without 
adequate outside inspection of the quality of bank assets, made the 
structure highly vulnerable. '!here were two, interrelated problems: 
that of the failure of an :1nd1vidual bank due to insolvency (:insufficient 
value_ 1n assets to cover deposits) or 1lliquidity (inadequate liquid 
asset reserves canbined with inadequate abillty to convert other assets 
into cash quickly in event of strong sh.ti't in depositor preference toward 
currency); an:i the spreadjng effects of a single bank failure on depositor 
confidence in other banks. The structure of the banlq.ng system did little 
to protect 1nilvidual banks or the banking system fran bank runs and panics. 
And the structure was tested by a seri.es of exogenous events. Of 
great importance was the greater infiation :in Japan during World War I 
than elsewhere, canb:1ned with the effort throughout the 1920s to deflate 
the econcxey sufficiently to return to the gold standard at the prewar 
parity.5 This difficulty was exacerbated by the world business cycle 
exogenous to Japan; the recession of 1920-21 and the depression of 1930-
31 had maJ or i.~acts. It is estimated that during 1921-22, as a con­
sequence of recession am sharply declining price levels, about 20 per­
cent of all ccmnercial bank outstanding loans an:i advances could oot be 
paid off on schedule; underlying collateral was either illiquid or 
valueless {Kang, 1960, p. 23ij). 
And then there was the randan shock: the Kanto earthquake of 1923. 
'lhe earthquake caused trererxious additional losses. The governnent an:i 
Bank of Japan correctly stepped :in rapidly to provide support, including 
the discounting of what c~ to be known as "earthquake bills", sorre 
of which never did achieve any W'Xierlying value. '!heir life an:i use was 
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extended until the denouement of spring 1927, when debate over the issue 
of further extension of the guarantee of the remaining ¥109 million in 
ccmnercial bank portfolios led to disclosure of the possible unsoondness 
of several banks holding earthquake bills; this resulted in bank runs 
culminating in the most profound banking crisis Japan has ever endured. 
Deposits shifted dramatically from small banks especially to postal 
savings (a completely riskless fonn of t.ime deposit) and to some extent 
6
to large banks (true more of roonetary than t:1me deposits) • The succes­
sion of bank runs and eroding confidence of depositors in small banks 
was the basic cause of the failure and merger of banks during the inter­
war period. 
Gove:rnm:nt policy abetted this process of consolidation. The short­
run response of the IOOnetary authorities to a bank panic was to attempt 
to contain it :frcm spreading through substantial provision of emergency 
loans to affected banks deemed worth saving; this was fully appropriate. 
The longer-run response was to strengthen the financial system by impos­
ing high liquidity and capital requirerrents.7 It was difficult to im­
pose m1nirm.ml requirements on conmercial banks, but the Banking Act of 
1927 set large m1n:innJm paid-in capital requirements to be enforced by 
1932, ranging :frcm ¥500,000 for towns under 10,000 population to ¥2,000,000 
for Tokyo and Osaka. That, combined with the banking crisis of 1927, gave 
the Government the will and the leg:1.slaticn to force bank consolidation. 
'!he interwar period is often regarded as the period of the concen­
tration of finance into the "Big Five" banks, and the attendant consolida­
tion of the power of the ''Big Four" zaibatsu. While to sorre extent this 
was true, roore so when Zaibatsu-controlled insurance an:i trust conpanies 
are included, it appears that (a) the extent of aggressive zaibatsu 
efforts at financial concentration prior to the wart1me cootrols of the 
late 1930s has been exaggerated, arxi (b) focus on the ''Big Five" is in 
part an artifact of historical scholarship. 'lhe large banks generally 
behaved quite conservatively throughout this pericxi, particularly follow­
~ the 1927 crisis. 'Ihey terxied to have surplus furrls, arxi rnana.:,"'ed 
their portfolios conservatively. They sought safe, large customers, not 
small.. Moreover, there was considerable turm::>il within the large bank 
sector, particula.I'ly following World War I. cl Interest1.ngly the Fifteenth 
Bank, :1.nitially by far the largest conmercial. bank in Japan (with half 
the capital of the total banking system at its fonnation), is seldan 
included in the discussion of large banks. The formation of the Sanwa 
Bank in 1933 poses an anaJ.ytical problem for those supporting the ''Big 
Four" zaibatsu financial concentration thesis; it thereby became the 
largest bank in Japan, with total assets 16 .6 percent greater than its 
next competitor Sumitomo Bank, and 30-40 percent above Mitsui an:i 
Mitsubishi Banks respectively. 
Financial IAlalism 
'Ille growth of large banks relative to small arxi the sharp reduction 
1n numbers of smaller banks, together with the evolving interplay between 
the m:xlern financial system an:i traditional sources of finance, raise 
irrJ>ortant issues concerning the nature and degree of financial dualism 
during the interwar perioo. 9 The clearest indicators of financial-dual­
ism are differentials in interest rates on borrowed funds arxi in access 
to funds by category of borrower (such as firm size) substantially in 
excess of transactions costs and default risks. 'Ihese differentials 
arise through financial market imperfections, due to urrleroeveloped 
f1nancial markets or to oligopolistic market power of financial institu-
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tions (and to government regulation, not so important 1n prewar Japan), 
and through non-profit-max1miz.1ng behavior of individuals an:i institutions. 
Financial dualism is analagous to the much better documented differentials 
and dualism in labor markets (Yasuba, 1976). 
'lhese differentials are frequently associated with "traditional" 
versus ''rood.em" sectors. 'Ihe traditional sector consisted of very small­
scale units of production, essentially all agriculture and miniscule 
1r¥iustrial am c0l'lll1ercial enterprises (defined as having less than 
¥10 ,000 total assets arxi fewer than seven t«>rkers on average, predcm-
1nantly family rembers or apprentices, in 1932) • Traditional sources of 
finance were family arxi friends, moneylen:iers, and rotating credit co­
operatives (tanomoshiko or najin). It is important to urxierstand that 
location in the traditional sector does not necessarily imply either 
non-profit--OlaJdmizing behavior or a high degree of segµientation between 
traditional and rood.em financial markets. For exan;,le, we do not know 
the extent to which family and friends provided credit on maximizing 
or other criteria, or how the relative importance of such criteria 
evolved over time. By the interwar period individuals throughout the -
econany had a wide range of options among financial an:i real assets. 
Empirical evidence on interest rate differentials or access to 
credit by finn size is so fra@llentary for the interwar period that it is 
not yet possible to assess how significant financial dualism was. Con­
temporary literature refers to the difficulties small business had in 
borrowing in the 192e-32 pericxi of bank consolidation but little enpiri­
cal evidence is presented. Survey data by finn size for Tokyo wholesale 
am retail finns in 1931 arxl for Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe manufacturing 
finns for 1932 do not indicate any substantial interest rate differentials 
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except for those largest firms able to issue boros • Moreover, it appears 
that m:>st f1nns of all sizes in the interwar period were able to finance 
long-tenn investnent needs internally or through equity issue (in roost 
cases sold privately of course, in smaller firms typically to famlly and 
t'riends) . Debt equity ratios were low an::l decl.ming over the period 
(Fujino and Teranishi, 1975, p. 339). These ~tary bits of 1nforna­
tiai suggest that, while large banks azx:i other financial. institutions may 
have provided the loan and investment funds ptimarily to large industrial. 
enterprises and smaller banks to smaller businesses, tre financial. sys­
tem as a whole was sufficiently ccmpetitive with specific financial 
markets sufficiently interrelated that serious market se~tation and 
major interest rate differentials ani access to funds by firm size within 
the modern sector was not a major feature of the interwar econorcy. That 
is to say, financial dualism may well not have been a significant feature 
of the nm.em sector. With the evidence so scanty, this can be regarded 
only as a hypothesis deserving further research. 
kl alternative approach is to examine the relative importance of 
nxxiern ver::,us tra,11 tional sources of f\.1.nn~ by different types of borrow-
ers, and hence their degree of integration into the roodern f.:1nancial 
system. At the apex were the vecy large industrial corporations, able 
to issue bonds and borrow funds virtually at will. While reliance on 
external funds apparently was approximately constant by firm size for 
all but the largest (which borrowed nx>re), the c~sition shifted 
substantially. As firm size decreases, the proportion of external 
credit derived from modern financial institutions decreases an::l that 
£ran traditional sources (zooneylenders, family and frierrls) increases. 
Miniscule firms relied overwhelmingly on traditional sources of finance. 
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Traditional sources of finance continued to be very 1.nportant in agr-1-
culture as well • .An agricultural survey in 1932 indicates sare 52 
percent of agricultural credit continued to cc::me fran traditional sources, 
despite the growing role of nx:xiern financial institutions specifically 
designed for farmers (Table 1 and Teranishi, 1976). 
M:>neyleniers are the prototype of the traditional financial inter­
mediary. Linkages between the traditional arrl mcdern f1nancial sectors 
had becane sufficiently close by the beginn:1ng of the twentieth century 
that the lending rates of mneylenders arrl banks IOOVed rather closely 
together. 'lliis continued in the interwar period. Moneylender interest 
rates fluctuated less cylically than bank loan rates, arrl were (not 
surprisingly) always higher.10 'Ibe number of roneylenders reached a 
peak in 1924 or so, arrl did not begin to decline substantially until after 
1935. Their working capital showed a similar pattern, reaching a peak 
of ¥733 million in 1925, arrl declining only after 1930. (These data are 
based on Tax Bureau statistics, hence presumably are underestimates.) 
Interest rates on rooneylender loans were lower in urban than rural areas, 
and lower in mre developed than less developed rural 8.&.-eas. As Sr..:1.buya 
notes, this reflects the greater development of, and competition from, 
11IOOdern financial institutions in these economically roore advanced areas. 
It seems evident that the predaninant financial dualism in the per­
iod continued to be between the traditional and nn:lern sectors, in agri­
culture, industry, arrl finance. Miniscule firms, continuing to rely 
upon relatively simple technology, very small anounts of capital, arrl 
family labor, had only limited though presumably increasing access to 
credit from m:>e.ern financial institutions. Accordingly they continued 
to rely predom:lnantly upon traditional sources of finance. At the sane 
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t1me there was sufficient 1nterconnectiai between traditional am. nooern 
financ1al markets, with nows of funds am interest rate detennination 
1n the latter 1ncreasirigly daninating the fornEr, that it is not clear 
that the extent of the financial dua11 stic gap was severe. en this 
point too further research is needed. 
Ole final point should be made 1n this overview. 'lhe World War II 
pericx:l, 1937-1945, bro~t profow-d changes 1n the rules of the sane of 
the financial system an:i 1n the banking structure. Interest rates were 
caitrolled administratively, credit was allocated directly, entry was 
virtually ended, the c~rcial banking system was consolidated further 
into a few (nationwide) city banks and, 1n principle, one local bank per 
. prefecture. This was the period in Which major Zaibatsu financial ani 
other economic power became highly concentrated (Bisson, 1954 an:l Hadley, 
1970). And it was this wartime-engendered set of controls, policies, 
and banking structure-rather than those of the interwar period am. 
earlier-which have determined the financial policies arxi structure of 
the financial system since World War II. 
III. The Financing of Corporate Business 
As analyzed elsewhere in this volume, econanic growth during the 
interwar period was led by investment and production in manufacturing 
and facilitating industries. Tl"e financing of large enterprise has been 
relatively well documented, but we still know little about the financial 
relations of smaller firms . 'Ihe Allied Occupation zaibatsu company 
files proVide infonnatioo on the financing of smaller (s~con:i ani third 
line) as well as the major canpanies under the 83 desig;13.ted zaibatsu 
-13-
tx>ld:ing companies.12 Ia.ta a,. the Mitsubishi zaibatsu are relatively 
canprehensive, am are here used for a case study •13 
Evidence on the sources and uses of f'uoo.s for major industrial 
Table 2 finns is provided in Table 2. Several points stan:i out • Q1e is the
here 
always substantial reliance on increases in paid-in capital. This was 
mainly by allottmant to existing shareholders (including zaibatsu hold­
ing cOOi)anies), though sane shares were newly issued for public sub­
scription through the stock market (Shimura, 1969, p. 222, Table 4-11). 
Secom. is the relative modest reliance on retained earnings (reserves) 
except in the 1932-36 period. A third is the increasingly large im­
portance of corporate bond issue during the 1920s. The carmercial banks , 
trust companies, am :insurance canpanies were rrajor purchasers. Corres­
pondingly, reliance on (bank) borrowing, trade credit, and other short­
term sources was quite nxxiest until 1937-41. 
'Ihe f\md1ng of the Mitsubishi major industrial corporations in the 
mid-1930s follows these general patterns. The overall growth an:i 
evolution of Mitsubishi, especially the family-owned holding company 
Mitsubishi Goshi (incorporated in 1937 as Mitsubishi Honsha) and its 
first-line subsidiaries, have been quite well documented.14 There are 
problems in defining the membership and size of the prewar Mitsubishi 
za.1batsu. Takahashi am Aoyana (cited in Hatade, 1978, pp. 322-3) 
indicate Mitsubishi in 1937 comprised 73 industrial companies, including 
six first-line an:i 29 seconi-line, having 5-5 percent of Japan's total 
industrial paid-in capital. Iwai (1937) used a scmewha.t rore restricted 
definition, and a slightly different listing of first-line canpanies; by 
that definition the Mitsubishi share, including financial institutions, 
1n 1937 was 3.3 percent of total corporate paid-in capital (Hadley, 1970, 
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pp.. 54-5).15 
'lhe first-line subsidiaries, wlier the formal authority of the 
holding cooipany, were the mst inportant operational coIJl)Ol"l:ent of the 
zaibatsu. Here too definitional difficulties exist, especially over 
time, due mainly to the dynamic evolution of individual firms.
16 For 
analysis of the 1935-37 period I use Hatade's listing (1978, p. 300) of 
first-line 1n1ustrial subsidiaries plus Mitsubishi Chemical Industry 
(see Table 3) because it grew so rapidly in fixed investment between 
1935-37 as to rank fourth in total assets (¥48 .1 m1.lllon) in 1937, 
tholJ€11 still far behind the three dom:1nant corrpanies: Mitsubishi Trad­
ing (¥390.2 million), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (¥301:L3 million) an:1 
Mitsubishi Mining (¥214 .1 million). The first-line subsidiaries also 
included three financial institutions: Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi 
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Trust C~, and Mitsubishi Marine an:1 Fire Insurance Ccxnpany. 
'!be detailed. data for 1935-37 reflect the evolution of the funding 
process for first-line subsidiaries since the end of World War I. Most 
important was the transformation of Mitsubishi Goshi !'ran an operating 
to a holding cou1t-1any, still f'..tlly Iwashaki=0wned, as it spun off de-
~nts into first-line subsidiary companies. Hatade argues (1978, 
ch. 5-6) that one reascn for these organizational changes was the in­
ability of Gosh1
18 to finance expansion !'ran its internal resources an:1, 
mre importantly, that by the early 1930s Goshi bad substantially turned 
over rnanag~nt operating decisions concerning finance as well as other 
matters to first-line subsidiaries. Alroost all Goshi's investrrents were 
1n shares in subsidiaries. In two cases foreign capital was involved 
1n first-line companies; Westinghouse Electric Con:pany invested 1n 10 
percent of Electric Manufacturing' s shares fran 1923, and Oil was an 
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essentially 50-50 joint venture with Tidewater Associated 011 Ccrrpany 
established in 1931. Initially., IOOst stock issues were absorbed withln 
Mitsubishi. However., during the 1920s several companies (Mining., Bank., 
'Irust) opened new stock issues to public subscription. While this rmy 
initially be in substantial part due to gove:mnent pressure., by deliberate 
strategy it becane an increasingly important erte:rnal source of ftnds by 
the m1d-1930s as discussed below. Also con:panies issted bonds. To what 
extent they were purchased by Bank., Trust and the various ilisnmnce can­
panies is not clear but apparently it was substantial. For instance 
Sh1pbuilding's bond issue in the 1920s was purchased entirely by Bank 
(Hatade., 1978., ch. 5). 
By the m1d-1930s a quite clear pattern of finance had emerged., well 
Table 3, demCX1Strated in the balance sheet data for 1935 (Table 3) and the sources 
, 5 here 19and uses of funds for 1936 and 1937 (Tables 4 and 5) . Ialg-term in­
vestnents., in fixed assets and securities., were essentially funded entirely 
by lcng-term sources., in both stock and flow terms. Net worth was the 
overwheJ.ming soun:e; bond issue was negllg1ble with the important exceptions 
of Mining and Chenrl.cal Industries in 1937. Alm:)st two-thirds of net worth 
was in paid-in capital and its increases. Peliance on short-term credit­
borrow1ngs., trade credit., advance payments., accounts payable-varied con­
siderably; Trading naturally used large amounts and proportims of trade 
receivables and payables and short-term bank borIDwi.-rigs to finance its 
net trade credit balances . 
Finn growth was funded fran three categories of sources: internal to 
firm., internal to the Mitsubishi za.ibatsu., and external ftnds fran the 
public. It appears that firm internal sources were used first, to fmd 
relatively m:>dest new investnents. However., the earlier priority towaro 
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t\ndmg internal to the z.a.1.batsu, was sarewhat attenuated :1n 1935-37-
in part probably due to the Cal.Strain.ts tpon zaibatsu :internal sources 
relative to the substantial increases in fixed :1nvestnent and in equity 
t\nds to subsidiaries by Heavy Industries and M:1n:1ng :1n both 1936 and 
1937, and by Chemical Industries' fixed :1nvestnent :1n 1937. 
'1he sources of funds generated internally by the firm are straight­
f'orward: retained eanrtngs, depreciation allowances, and legp..l and optimal 
reserve ftnds. They are all long-term in nature. tespite the substantial 
growth and profitability of first-line finns, by 1935 internally generated 
t\nds were only 54.9 pereent of paid-in capital. Firms were expected to 
pay most profits out in dividends. This was an effective technique for 
transferring ftnds upward (often to Goshi and the Iwasaki families) where 
they could be allocated to new areas of rapidly growing investIIEnt require­
mmts. Ftnds which might have been internal to the firm thereby becar?E 
internal to the zaibatsu as a whole, depending on the degree to which 
stock was held publicly. 
Ft.nds internal to the Mitsubishi zaibatsu were both lang-tenn and 
short-term, and in a variety of forms. Full data are not available, but 
the Occupaticn records indicate general patterns. Shares were held verti­
cally by Goshi, laterally by other first-line conparrl.es, and in small 
aIOOunts by senior enployees, and in a few instances directly by Iwasakis 
(see Table 3). The Occupatioo records do not indicate holders of the 
bmds issued, but probably Mitsubishi financial institutims were predominant. 
'1he m:>st substantial shift to external sources occurred in new share 
issues over 1935-37 totalling ¥93.5 million. Goshi took only 18.6 percent. 
It maintained its full ownership of Trading and proportionate share of 
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011~ increased absolute holdings but <Ecreased its share of Heavy, and 
nxxiestzy decreased holdings in Mining, Warehouse, and Electr.1.c .Manufactur1ng. 
'!be share issues of Electr.1.c., Warehouse, Min:1.ng, and part of Heavy., about 
45 percent of the total, were sold to the public. Chemical, a close secmd 
to Heavy in increase in paid-in capital 1935-37, had all its equity provided 
20by 1~ joint owners Asahi Glass and Mining. (It could be a.rgled that 
Mining's own public equity issue was used to finance Cllemical.) The public 
demand for Mitsubashi shares were apparentzy stra,g. They were sold at a 
premitm1., and the Heavy Industr.1.es 1935 issue was oversubscr.1.bed 27 tirrEs 
(Ecmanic Planning Agency., 1958, pp. 140-41). 21 'Ihe securities holdings 
of first-line co:rrpany were overwhelm:1ngly stocks., predominantzy of subsi­
d:1ar.1.es but also small amomts in other first-line firms, the limited bond 
holdings were nm-related, ma.inly govemrrent. 
By contra.st first-line so~es and uses of short-term funds were quite 
22heavily :internal to the Mitsubishi zaibatsu, at least :in the first instance. 
By and large trade credit was to and from subsidiaries, other first line 
f'1nffi notably Trad:ing, and affiliates. Heavy Industries received substantial 
advance paynents f'rom the Navy IepartrrEnt, as well as extend:ing it smaller 
but si©"lificant amounts of credit. Borrowing was predorn:1nantly from Bank, 
with two major exceptions. Trading., by far the largest short-term borrower, 
obta:ined about 30 percent fran Bank, slightzy less fran Yokohama. Specie 
Bank, and the remamder from other (mspecified) non41:i.tsubishi institutions. 
011 was the onzy clear case of conpetition; during 1935-37 it borrowed 
substantially more from Sumitomo Bank and Sumitomo Trust Conpany than from 
M:1.csubishi Bank and Mitsubishi Trust Corrpacy--and at lower interest rates. 
'fu:! data suggest interest rate conpetition: in 1936 Mitsubishi charg-es 4.75 
percent, SumitomJ 4. 38 percent; in 1937 Mitsubishi dropped to the 4. 38 
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percent rate, but S1.ll11.taoo charged 4.015 percent.
23 Ieposits were mainly 
1n Bank and Trust, though Trading also had substantial 0=p
osits 1n Yokohama. 
Specie Bank. Interestingly, srne f1nns held tenporarily s
urplus f\nds in 
their parent, Heavy Industries in Goshi and Cllem1.cal Indus
tries 1n Mining 
and Asahi Glass. 
All first-line f.inns had a system of enployee <Eposits; fa
r Mining and 
Heavy Industries they were not negligible, 1n 1935 can:pris
ing 4. 9 percent 
and 7.7 percent of total liabilities respectively. Woricer <Eposi
ts were 
apparently perceived as a fringe benefit to enployees, sin
ce interest rates 
paid were substantially above indiv:1.dual fixed CEposit rat
es 1n banks or 
M1n.1ng paid a 6.57 percent interestcazpany borrowing rates fran banks. 
rate on enployee deposits 1n 1936 and 1937, while it was borrow
ning in 1937 
It appears that worker CEposits and pension fundsat 4. 4 percent from Bank. 
-were also used substantially to finance car.pany investnents 1n 
securities 
of subsidiaries and other zaibatsu rernbers. 
'lhe .Allied· Occupation zaibatsu files are cne of the few so
urces of 




Tables 6;; 7j and 8 prov:1.de balance sheet and sources and of fu
nds data for 
the 15 second-line Mitsubishi subsidiaries which existed i
n 1935 and for 
As their nanEs indicate, six were subsidiarieswhich the files contain data. 
1n the Enpire, Shanghai, or Singapore. 
24 While size varied substantially, 
all were small, with conpany assets less than ¥10 million 
as of 1935. Cnly 
one, Tokyo (later Mitsubishi) Steel Products, gr-aduated to firs
t-line sub­
sidiary status by war-€nd. Seven finns were in manufacturing, t
hree 1n 
coal mining, two in wholesale trade, and one each in a railroa
d for coal 
mining, warehousing, and rubber plantations. 
As Table 6 indicates, M:1n1ng owned by far the roost subsidiaries 1
n 
the sanple, mostly coal mines and related ra.ilxoad facilit
ies which financially 
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were little more than c.perat1ng d1visions. Trading had small equity posi­
tions in a large nunt,er of coopanies whose purchases and sales it handJed, 
and probably eJiereised substantial ccntrol through narket1ng arra.ngerIEnts 
ratrer than ownership. For three carpanies ownership was sufficiently 
spread among first-line carpanies and Goshi that ccntrol could not be 
ascertained. Consolidated Sangyo, interestingly, was owned directly by 
the Iwasaki families, with no involvement of zaibatsu finns. 25 Mitsubishi 
control prevailed; all conpanies were privately-held, even where Mitsubishi 
<::Mn:!rship was not conplete. 
The financing patterns for seccnd-1.in:! subsidiaries were similar to 
those for first-1.in:! carpanies, but sinpler and IIDre pronounced. The pre­
daninant source of ftmds was internal to the zaibatsu, rna1n1y from parent 
finns; both internally generated funds and those external to Mitsubishi 
were much less inportant. 1.Dng-tenn financing needs, predominantly for 
fixed investnEnt, were entirely financed by net worth, as indeed were the 
preponderance of total assets. In 1935, 88. 4 percent of the net worth of 
the 15 COJit)anies amounting to ¥40.1 million (conpared with ¥296.6 million 
for the 7 first-line conpanies) was in paid-in capital, and net worth 
equalled 72.0 percent of total assets. :Reliance on equity :funding varied 
with the d:gree of fixed investment in total assets, with capital-intensive 
coal mining at one extrene and the trading cCJipanies at the other. More­
over, firnls based overseas had substantially higher net worth/total asset 
ratios than donestic finns, even within manufacturing and mining. 
Between 1935-37 total assets increased for every finn except Sakai 
~mical and Shanghai Warehouse. While absolute amounts of investrrent were 
substantial for the coal mining conpanies, the relative rates of growth 
due to fixed investment were most rapid for Mitsubishi Olernical Industry 
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Mach:1rery (1937 total assets 4.2 tines those in 1935), Manchuria Mitsubish
i 
Engireering (3. 9 tiites) , and Tokyo Light Alloy ( 2. 6 t1nes) , a1d investIIEnts 
in inventories and receivables by ~obi (2.1 t1nes). Growth was f\nded 
pr1mar1ly by new stock issl.E to parent finm, which accomted for 74.9 per
­
cent of the increase 1n net worth in 1936-7 of ¥27. 7 million and, more 
than neeting long-term uses, alore funded 59.2 percent of the growth in 
total assets. Interestingly, the relaticnship between profitability and
 
growth of assets by firms was roughly inverse. Engireering and Chemica
l 
Industry actually nade losses, while the most profitable finns included
 
Sakai, Bibai, Yabetsu, and Shoko. Presumably hi~ growth firms were new
er 
and had higher start-up costs, but had good future prospects. 'lliis dis
­
parity in 1nd1vidual finn sources .and uses helps explain the large stock
 
issi.e, since retained earning:J and depre ciaticn allowanres in 1936-7 was 
equal to 85. 0 percent of seccnd-line fixed investIIEnt. It also appears 
that firms ~re using stock isstE in 1937 to build up liquid assets in 
anticipation of further fixed investIIEnt plans. 
While internal sources of funds increased, most funding ca.tTE from 
otrer sources within the Mitsubishi zaibatsu. Notably, any subsidiaries
 
engaging in substantial fixed investnent (other than highly profitable 
Consolidated Sangyo) funded it through stock subscription by pa.rent firm
s 
and other stockholders essentially proportional to holdings. All were 
closely-held subsidiaries; public stock subscription was not used, not 
(ranges in the structuresurprising g1ven their relatively small size. 
of ownership within Mitsubishi did occur, notably the sharp decline in 
Goshi 's ownership of Tokyo Steel Products with Mining becaning the larg
est 
Cnly ore f:tnn, Oemical Machirery,shareholder follo\Ed by Heavy Industries. 
had long term borrowings, obtaired from Mitsubishi Trust. 
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With the exception of t:t:e two seccnd-lire trading canpanies and Shoko 
Glass, reliance en short-tenn funds was relatively 11m1.ted. Several can­
pardes financed fixed 1nvestID=nt f'ran short-tenn sources in 1936, covered 
by tre parents' provision of long-tenn equity funds 1n 1937; Yabetsu sirrply 
obtained advances from its parent, M:1n1ng, and Light Alloy and Chemical 
Machinery borrowed fran Mitsubishi Bank. Most donestic seccnd-lire canpanies 
had a banking relationship with Mitsubishi Bank, evidently th:ir rna.1.n source 
of bank loans. In addition several had deposit relationships with a number 
of carpetitor banks. 'Ibis sazewhat Surt)rising f'act may well be explained 
in tenn.5 of convenience, since Mitsubishi Bank had only 27 branch:s during 
this period. L'ata on overseas carpany banking relationships, while lirnited, 
suggests they relied pr.imarily upon Yokohama. Specie Bank and the semi­
gove.rmental colonial banks. 'lhe practice of depositing short-term ftmds 
with the parent carpany, noted for f'irst-line carpanies, was inplemmted 
at this level as ~11 in the cases of Bibai, ~obi, and Yabetsu at least. 
Most of the second-lire finns had trade and tra.CE credit relationships 
with Tra.n1n.g in adn1tion to tre-1-r p;=rr-ent finn; they provided nonna.l trade 
credit to a variety of' custorrers, most of which were not zaibatsu rernbers. 
In sum, the second-line conpanies were much more d;pendent on their 
parent for both long-tenn and short-term funds than was the case for first­
lire conpanies, and hence more dependent on funding internal. to the Mitsubishi 
Zaibatsu. 'Ibey were too small to obtain funds frora the public or outside 
firancial institutions, with the 1.nportant exception of those finns opera.­
ting in the En:pire, especially Manchuria, where serni-goverrurental funding 
was possible. Yet trere is no evidence that these finns suffered from a 
short of funds, total or equity. In on= sense the first-line cOI!l)anies 
were t.:t:eir financial inte:rm:diaries with the outsid; world. More irrportantly, 
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they were their owners and masters. The reliance upo
n and provision of 
equity capital suggests it was the (first-line) paren
t conpanies that 
In this perceptive second-lire carpanydecided wh:!n to expand., and where. 
f1nanc:1al dependency was part and parce1 of their ove
rall dependence. 
'I'V Conclusion 
'lll:1.s essay renects., and sq:>ports a general point of 
view which sees 
the developnent of Japan's financial system in the int
e:rwar period as one 
or natural., evolutionary growth and diversification based on rather carrpe­
titive maricet forces., within financial markets and in
 business demand for 
credit and related financial servires. Iarge financi
al institutions ser­
Nonetreless there was
Viced large corpora.ticns, small institutions small. 
sufficient interaction am:mg financial narkets that s
igJ'lificant financial 
dualism did not energe within the modern sector. 'Ihe
 main financial dualism 
was between the m::x:iern and the traditional sector of agricu
lture and miniscule 
Zaibatsu finns and financial institutionsin:iustrial and connerical finns. 
grew during the period as a whole., but so too did oth
ers. 'Ihe overwhelming 
concentration of eccnomic power to the Big Four Zaiba
tsu was to corr.e about 
later within the context of the ccntrolled., centralized e
canacy of World 
War Il. 
lJ:he Mitsubishi zaibatsu provides a useful case study 
of the evolution 
of corporate finance., 'lhere was., first, the predomin
ant relia11.ce on funding 
internal to the zaibatsu. Net worth for the first....1.1.n::
! subsidiaries in 1935 
was equal to 51.1 percent of total assets., 70. 4 percent wh
en Trading with 
its huge trade credit and borrowings is excluded, and
 for seccnd-lire subsi­
diaries 72.0 percent. 'Ilus was overwhelmingly in the
 form of paid-in 
capital rather than retaired earnings and reserve acc
ounts in individual 
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.t'J.nns. Nonetheless IOOSt of the equity was derived fran acCUimJ.lated profits 
internal to the Zaibatsu as a whole. Between 1935 and 1937 this pattern 
changed substantially for first-lire coopanies, as about 45 percent of the 
~ am::>unt of new shares issted was sold, directly or indirectly, to the 
public. For second-line finns, however, relianre on zaibatsu-int.ernal funds 
through their first-lire parents persisted. Both first-lire and seccnd-
line short-term financial relationships-deposits, loans, trace credit 
received and ext.ended-were substantially with Mitsubishi financial insti­
tutions. Ch balance these probably represented net inflows fran the public, 
ma:1nJ.y because of the larg-e share of Mitsubishi Trading in total current 
liabilities (58.6 percent of both first-lire and second-line conpanies in 
1935) canbired with its predominant relianre en bank loans from non-Mitsubishi 
sources. However, lack of data prevent DIJY quantitative assessIJEnt. Given 
:internal profits, the strength of its financial institutions and the attra.c­
tiveress of new share issues by first-line conpanies in the open market it 
is difficult to argue that the Mitsubishi zaibatsu was constrained to grow 
less rapidly than it desired dte to lack of access to finanre. 'Il1e evirence 
:indicates that, through the financial support of their parents, this was 
as true of second-lire subsidiaries as those in the first rank. 
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FOOINarES 
•r have benefited fran the research assistance of Donna Doane, Tan 
Doelne, Yasunori HaIJna, &iward Lincoln, Eric Rasmusen and Om 'lhanas. 
1An extensive, detailed, though not fully comprehensive literature 
exists 1n Japanese. 'lbe English language literature is ruch m:>re sparse, 
and is frequently derivative of Japanese scholarship. Useful references 
1n F.ngl.ish for the interwar period include Yamanura (1972) and (1978), 
Patrick (1971), Teranishi (1977), and Fuji Bank (1967). In addition, 
inportant materials exist 1n manuscript form, especially Goldsmith (1972), 
Feldman (1976), and Kang (1960). 
2See, for instance, the paper in this voll.lIIE by Hidena.sa ~rikawa, 
as well as Patrick (1971) arxl Yamanura (1972). 
lnu.s is 1n part a definitional artifact, due to the establishment 
of the Sanwa Bank 1n 1933. The "Big Five" bank share of deposits as 
defined 1n Table 1 was 15.5 percent 1n 1940 (colq)uted fran Mitsubishi 
4For annual data and analysis see Teranishi (1977, p. 45lf'). 
~r a discussion of this macro problem, and the difficulties its 
policy implementation caused the financial system, see Patrick (1971). 
~r analyses see Teranishi (1977) and Feldman (1976). 
7t1rx1er the Savings Bank Act of 1921 sav1ngs banks had to have a 
m1n:1m.un capital of ¥500,000 am had to hold gove:rnm:nt am other bonds, 
as well as reserves with the Ministry of Finance Deposit Bureau. Trust 
canpanies under the 1922 law required capital of ¥1,000,000. In fact, 
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sav1ngs banks had by far the higl'"est deposit/paid-in capital ratios and 
accord1ngly the highest profit rates of all major categories of financial 
institutions (Feldman, 1976, pp. 33-38). 
~ essay by Hidemasa ~ikawa 1n this voltmie is particularly use­
ful on these points. 
9'1his discussion is based substantially on Teranishi and Patrick 
(l.977). 
1~ paragraph is based on Shibuya (1962). 
~ evolutionary process whereby traditional financial instituticns 
first became, 1n effect, hybrids and then m:rlern financial institutions is 
best exemplified 1n mujin, tre traditicnal rotating credit cooperative 
for rutual help am::,ng people who knew each other. Eventually they became 
less personalized installment deposit and len:tlng organisations, particu­
larly for small business. 'lbe first ccmnercial muj 1n was started 1n 1901; 
by 1915 the number had increased so rapidly that tre Muj 1n Business Law 
was passed to regulate them. Extensive revision of the law 1n 1931 
stipulated that muj in had to be j oi.."'lt~stcck Cl.!!IPan.ies; 
12.niese included major cotton spinning conpanies and their subsidi­
aries (Hadley, 1970, pp. 464-5). SCAP required infonna.tion ·on sane 3,000 
canpanies regarded as first, secom., and third line subsidiaries or affil­
iates. Tnese materials are 1n 1ndividual canpany files in approximately 
~O boxes 1n the U.S. National Archives at Sutland, Maryland. In prin­
ciple ccmpanies reported, 1n English, fran 1935 an.'lual balance sheets, 
ownership, long-tenn debt, stock and bond holdings by issuer, loans and 
other liabilities by source, and related financial data. Actual cover­
age varies widely; 1n sane cases, especially for snaller conpanies, files · 
are so incanplete as to be virtually useless. 
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13SUbstantial materials are also available on the Mitsui zaibatsu; 
they were not saIDt,led s:1nce other studies are available (see Shibagak:1 
1965 and 1971) • 
14See, for ex.anl)le, Economic Plann:1ng Agency (1958), Hatade (1978), 
Iwa1 (1937), as well as Bisson (1954), Hadley (1970), am. the essay by 
ftk>rikawa in this vol1..11Ie. 
15ay the end of World War II Mitsubishi consisted of 241 carpanies, 
with 8.3 percent of total paid-:1n capital :1n Japan Proper am. 29.7 per­
cent of the nuch smaller am:,unt outside Japan (Hadley, 1970, pp. 26, 
50-51, 459) • Def:1nitions turn substantially on the degree of control 
Mitsubishi Honsha or its subsidiaries exercised over affiliated or "col­
lateral-line" canpanies :1n which only minority equity was held. 
16.ibus Mitsubishi Steel, never very successful, was absorbed into 
Nippon Steel CooJpany in 1935; Mitsubishi Airplane and Mitsubishi Ship­
bu1Jding merged to becane Mitsubishi Heavy Industries; Mitsubishi Real 
Estate was f1nally separated out from the holding company :1n 1937, IID.lch 
later than other major subsidiaries. 
17Unfortunately annual data on these :institutions for this period 
are not in the SCAP files. 
18iierearter Mitsubishi is left off cOIJ¥)a."1Y names. 
l9'Ihe sources ani uses nows are derived fran the balance sheet 
8lXi data on depreciation allowances taken fran profit and loss accounts; 
new fixed :investment equals changes in fixed assets plus depreciation. 
'!he tables, and Tables 6-ti, are derived fran the Allied Occupation zaibatsu 
tiles 1n the National Archives. 'Ihese tables nust be used with sane caution 
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since sooe reports, especially for secon:l-11ne subsidiaries, are in­
COOi)lete, there are data inconsistencies within and azoong reports, the 
English translations of accounting items were not always identical or 
correct, and mre detailed entries have been consolidated. 
2°'nu.s ownership pattern argues for classifying Chemical Industries 
as a secon1-11ne subsidiary. However, its size an:i growth were so large 
:f'ran 1937 that, 1n retrospect, it clearly was 1n transition to first­
class status. Note that as of 1935 Goshi held minority ownership in 
other first-line canpan.ies, not only 011 but also Bank and Trust (Hatade, 
1978, p • 320) . 
21Goshi used this opportunity to sell Heavy Industries shares 1n 
the market, making a capital gain of ¥().5 m1111on (Hatade, 1978, ch. 6). 
It repeated this process 1n 1937. This was another mechanism for ob­
taining external fuoos • 
22unrort unately data are not available on the proportion of deposits 
from and credit to Mitsubishi firms at Bank, Trust, and Mitsubishi in­
surance canpanies, so no evaluation can be na.de of Mitsubishi reliance 
on external funds generated by outsider deposits 1n its financial in­
stitutions. As noted below, the large borrowings of Trading !ran non­
Mitsubishi sources 1s an additional external channel; it is not possible 
, to know to what extent its trade credit and that of other Mitsubishi .finns 
was internal to the Zaibatsu. 'lbe evidence suggests IIn.lCh was not internal, 
at least by a fairly restrictive definition of the zaibatsu. 
23unrortunately data 1n the Occupation files on interest rates are 
~ntary. 
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Shoko Glass was 1n Manchuria.24caisol1dated Sangyo Koshi. 
~o data are available on its banking.an:i trade credit rel
atiaiships. 
It was anx,ng the roost profitable finns in the sample, earning 
about 14 
percent on net worth 1935-37, thereby able to finance its 
considerable 
fixed investment internally. 
I 
TABIB 1. PERCEl'il'AGE DISTRIBUTION OF DEPOSITS, AND WANS AND INVES'IMFNI'S, BY TYPE OF FINANCIAL 
.L~STI'ruTION, 1910-1940 
1910 1910 1920 1920 1930 1930 1940 1940 
(_l) ___(_2_)_ (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2L 
Crd1nary and Savings 72.8 73.6 70.3 72.1 47.4 50.7 46.4 45.5 
Largea 12.7 12.0 14.4 12.2 14.7 14.7 20.5 19.9
Local 60.1 61.5 55.9 59-9 32.7 36.0 25.8 25.6 
Special Banksb (Long-Tenn 
Credit Banks) 14.4 13.3 14.9 14.1 13.0 14.6 10.4 10.4 
Financial Institutions for 
Agriculture and ~l 
Businessb 0.3 0.5 2.2 1.6 7.1 7.0 13.5 9.0 ~ 
Trust Coolpan.1esc - - - - 7.6 6.4 8.1 5.8 
Ll.fe Insurance Canpaniesd 3.8 2.9 4.4 3.2 6.6 6.4 5.6 8.1 
Postal Saiings am Deposit 
Bureau 8.6 9.7 8.2 9.0 18.3 14.7 16.0 21.3 
Total woount (million yen) 2010 2429 10916 12444 21680 22412 62816 6lll8 
Source: Teranishi and Patrick ( 1977, 'l'"dbles 1 and 2) • 
Notes: ~ve banksel910-1930, six banks 1940; bDeposits plus financial debentures; Crrrust plus deposits;
serves; Postal savings am insurance and annuity. 
(1) Deposits; (2) Loans and Investroonts 
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TABIE 2. SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS OF LARGE INOOSTRIAL CORPORATIONS, 1914-1941 
A B 
1914 1922 1927 1928 1932 1937 
to to to to to to 
19211 1926 .. 19302 1931 1936 J241 _ 
(1) . -(2) (3) . (4) (5) .{6) 
I. Absolute Arrounts (bill. len) 
1. Paid-in capital 0.74 0.54 0.44 0.13 1.60 4.69 
2. Reserves 0.30 0.16 0.12 -0.14 0.93 2.54 
3. Corporate bonds. 0.10 o.48 0.69 0.53 -0.05 1.48 
4. Borrowings t 0 0.33 '1.30 - 0.11 -0.14 1.62 s. Other outside liabilities -23 -0.50 0.99 6.16 
6. Sources - total 1.37 1.51 1.55 0.13 3.33 16.49 
1. Fixed assets 1.41 1.16 1.12 0.60 1.20 3.53
8. Inventories 0.13 0.17 -0.00 -0.45 .67 4.36 
9. Other current assets 0.55 0.18 0.39 -0.02 1.47 8.60 
10. Uses - total 2.09 1.51 1.51 0.13 3.33 16.49 















3. Corporate bonds 7 
4. Borrowings ~ 185. Other outside liabillties 

































9. Other current assets 













Source: Bank of Japan (1966); A fran Table 124, pp. 334-5 (coverage 50:-75 firms);
B from Table 125, pp. 336-7 (coverage 295-330 finns). 
Notes: 1&an first half 1914 to second half 1921. 
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Total Liabilities 67985 6610 173577 11768 6377 1515 16418 
'lUI'AL 166775 22614 206352 32088 13445 3805 135748 
Proportio~ of Paid-in Gapit~
Held by 



















TABIE 3 (CONI'INUED): 
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi 
Heavy Warehouse Trading Electric 011 Chemical Mining
Industries Manufacturing Iooustries 
Iaig Tenn Assets 
Tangible Fixed Assets 40343 19364 16086 '7910 5393 2710 67258Intangibles 566 150





Inventories 55887 56484 11118 5353 311 10223Trade Credit 14586 1002 105138 ,4812 2475 319 17392Deposits &Gash 15474 18 5439 1459 16 355 4108Other 664 6296 220 73 2701Subtotal 117061 1684 173357 2:2602 7917 1045 34424 
'IDrAL 166775 22609 206350 3:2088 13445 3805 135750 
Annua.i Report rate 12/31/35 12/31/35 3/31/36 3/JV36 3131136 12/31/35 3/31/36 
Notes: 
8se@;regated in corporate accounts to turd enployee deposits, pensions et,c. 





TAl:llJ!; 4. SOURC&S ANl) USES OF FtJNIAS, ~G TER'il AND SHOR'r TERM: MI'l'SUBISHI FIRST•-LINE CCX•1PANIBS, 1936 (UNIT ¥ 1,000) 
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi MitsubishiHeavy Warehouse Trading Electric 011 Chemical M1n1ngIndustries Manufacturing Il¥1ustries
A. Sources of Ii\lnds : wng-Tenn 
1) Increase in shareholder equity 8211 230 2643 15937 1327 13032 10313Legal reserves 450 0 100 7170 32 4 0Other reserves 6572 194 584 1059Retained eamings 1189 
76 0 662936 1959 208 1219 28 368lfPaid-in capital 0 0 0 7500 0 13000 02) Increase 1n long tenn debt 0 0 0 0 0 0 03) Decrease of fixed assets 3683 403 1096 786(depreciation) 359 81 6602 
'rol'AL (1 + 2 + 3) 11894 633 3739 16723 1686 13113 16915
B. Uses of I<\..lr¥:ls: wng-Term 
Decreases 1n debt 0 1000 0 0 0Investioont in fixed assets 6144 211 
500 0
3008 3122 181 4877Capital participation+ securities 1594617045 (96) 19 740 456 0 10368
'IDrAL 23189 1115 3087 3862 637 5377 26314c. Increase 1n Working capital (11295) (482) 652(A-B • D-E) 12861 1049 7736 (9399) 
D. Assets (Uses) 
cash and deposits 7643 48 4006Receivables (4941) 
10398 (13) 7127 (3769)
Inventories 
(171) 32130 591 1280 355 166312341 0 34894 6425 ll48 653 2148
'IUI'AL 15043 (123) 71030 17414 2415 8135 936E. Ll.abilities (Sources) 
Workers' deposits 1852 108 332 332 30 158 1249Short term debt (300) 442 50100Trade credit 24025 (192) 19336 4221
0 524 0 3494
Other 877 173 5590811 0 609 0 (66) 68 3
'IDrAL 26388 358 70377 4553 1365 399 10336 




rABLE 5. SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS, I.DNG TERM AND SHORT TERM: MITSUBISHI FIRST-LINE COO'ANIBS, 1937 (UNIT¥ 1,000) 
Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Irxiustries 





A. Sources of Funds : wng-Tenn 
. 





2) Increase in long tenn debt 



















































TOI'AL (1 + 2 + 3) 43922 5908 13925 3455 4732 31207 52136 
B. Uses of P\mds : wng-Tenn 
Decreases in debt 
Investrrent in fixed assets 






















TOI'AL 32601 1130 8695 8093 3893 22299 53682 
c. Increase in Working capital
(A-B = D-E) 
11321 4778 5230 (4638) 839 8908 (1546) 

























TOl'AL 78013 3725 103676 9454 6724 9234 10973 
E. Liabilities (Sources) 
Workers' deposits































'IUI'AL 66692 (1056) 98443 14092 5885 326 12523 
Note: ( ) indicates negp.tive figures. Small differences between A-Band C-D are due to rounding. 
. .. .. 
T~ 6. ASSl:15 A.I> UABIL1TIE8, KrniWI311 Sl:XXH)-LD£ <XN'~, 1935 (ISlit If 1,000) 
-·-LJ.Abu.rI'Wi A:IJ NEr .uml Sruth Korean HippenJapan Yubetsu Sahl<al1n Anthracite Arch!- J\yob1 lilanc)la1 Tokyo
IEAn: Lldit Alloy Sakai 8.lbai Oollt1117 CollierJ Oollle17 llolw;/o 
Mltsub1sh1 Mancturta Cltnwllaatal1935 tectual Electric Nlt11ub1ah1 Steel Oiem. Jni.lln&f'actlll'q a-loal Ill Mltaubiahl ~ ~+ RR ♦ Ill ♦ Ill 8101ca1 aeel lllch1nlr7 lllntlllUle f\,owcte Nlch1nel'1 ._,,,_.q Glau bhl 
let Worth 
l:aplt.u, ~d-ln 1000 11150 18oo 5000
fwt&ine<l W1WlP 116 265 331 802 27~ 651 27 10 1500 750 ]000 5000
7500 200 300 1000 l2!i6 2000




650 255<lln'ent I.JAl:,U1t1n 
;,c,nc~n• ~lt• 311 119;ter:-:;."i:lS!;S 277 9 1110356 21 51U 30 30Tra-!, CNdlt 763 67299 2ij] 3311 2UIIII 3526 20 2111Ac:~..1:1-:.11 f'a>'able 563 3110 117 595 ]Ill 511 1511 1119 39 30 22 305 JSOther 19 236 110 82 lOll2 IllS..it,tct.al 11)6 36929 3311 3330 311311 lo81 492 8110 595 IIU 911893 30 22 1193 27t,
1 ~t....i l.1.ia.bll1 t tes 1136 929 331! 3330 )1134 1061 1192 8110 595 •1t1 25113 JO 22 119] 276
TOrAI. 1H39 2706 2530 9l22 6653 92611 721 118] 161111 1752 51159 15911 n2 39'.>' 591111
~lon or Pald-ln Olll>1W
lleld bJ 
1Uta411ahl Holding a,.... 0 0 0 0 0IUtaublllhl ar,.., 0 0 0 0 50S 115.0I 09].51 51.u lOOII 1~ lOOI 28.111'> lOOI Hl.71 96.21 lOOI &.;.OI 60.QI ~-91 0 -...erQaro1Je111116 IUnq 10111 58.5'~ ll1nilll lanq 1111111W ~ ~~ &J.m1;n.c1 Goahl- Ooahl- IIUall ANh1 '1....-s.......... .... ... ..... 
" 
T~ 6 (<Xlll'DlJEJ>)I 
South Korean N1pPQ'l
A.,.'.;E'l'S Yubetiu Slthlcal.1n AnthMl.cJ.te Arch!- Ryob1 ~ 
Tulcyo M1taub1Bh1 Hancba-1.a Ocn5olldated
Japan tectual Eleo~rio M1tllllb1Dhl steel a-. Ind. M1taub111hl 9lOlcD sar-e0
L1gt'L Woy Salal1 8J.ba1 OolllerJ Oolller, Q)Jlllll7 llakLlyo Producte ~ Glaaa loshlUIJI: 1935 !al ♦ !al ♦ !al ♦ ffi al0lra1 steel Mlch1ner7 . llaretlCUN llilch1nerJllnlfecturlng a-lcal 
~ Ter.ii Aaaete 
~Llel'1JledANeta 391 9UII 12-1 8688 5738 7571 l 2tt T 1551 1658 1318 119 1239 S-5d 
lr.~a.~tl•
Secarltin 17 102 5 109 158 -99
Suotot&l ~ 1086 12111 11693 511117 7729 1 3112 7 1555- 2157 13111 119 1239 S-58 
Qrn,nt A.sset11 
.:q: loyee i:leneru..• 33 202Oepo31ts l
Sccuritiee 
436 703 96 294 313 21167 63 6110 232lnVffltories 656 7011 l69 740 46(xiii 792 1290 76 26 8211 591 535 9112 2 35 554 23-lTraae Cretiit 
123 21 8 6 32 3 ,51 151 91 190 1116 11157 16.ie,..:;:iita • CUh 90 9 202 loo.ner 80] 1533 719 8111 1637 197 3702 Z75 653 Z715 liii2SJttotal 11131 162] 1290 53] 
2531 9226 6650 9262 720 lltl3 161111 1752 5859 159] 772 ]~ :,9--0T'J.Al, 11139 Z109 
Amua.l ~ 1..-te U/30/35 ~/]0/36 12/31/35 5/31/36 12/31/35 6/31/35 3/31/36 J/31/36 3/31/36 3/31/36 12/31/35 12/31/3:> 
Altnin1r.1 Cllemlcal RR ror Coal Coal coal '1nde Manu- '1nde Waret¥lUlle Pabrlca- Nlldd.nm7 ~ Sleet l\lbba'
1'181nne an:l pa,rts coal m1n1ng m1n1ng m1n1ng racture tim tim Glau l'llnt&ticn 
11ota1 ~ 1n corpcrate 8CCQll1ta to Cini Cllllloyee deposits, pena1ona, eta. 
bitei.s b:, tutsubiahi Mln1ng; no data avallabl• CIR other atocld¥>ldaN, preaablJ l81der QCIICl'Ql or II. ~-
COWied cllNC\l:, bf I--1 t•lln ~ to au. J..... SnU.Y1dlala (au- ,-JJ 26.51) 1111 J-- Nied nna ~ in~-
3all cltmiww Ja ..t ml llab1J.ltJ kltala .. tlw -it ot l"GIII.U.., 
' .. - ... 
TA.il.L 1. '.::nria:.:; t.:ID u::;;.;.'.l CF_ PUbl, UHi 'Il:.ffl AHD Slfflr '11:Jl'I: MJTSUUISIII SE£XH\-LIHE l'.(l-U'AHIES, 1936 (~IT¥ 1,000) 
Japan South Korean Nippon
1J.gnt Alloy Suka.1 
Yubeteu Sahkalln Anthracite Arch.1- ~obl81ba.1 0ollle17 Oolltery Shluvia1 Tokyo M1 tll\lb1shl KanchurtaMlnufactw-q Q:illlery Hokuyo tectue.1 Electric N1tllllb1ahl tm.,oll-iateda-teal RR + RR t RR t RR Sarai Steel 
Steel 0-. L"ld, IUtsulJlshl S,oi«J Sit-.-;,,,. Sources or F\n1s : I.AJl,g-~1'11 Ml.chlnerJ' ......~ ~rJnc Cl.Lua loanlProduct• Nlc:h1ne17 
1) Increase 1n aha.J'ehol.dll'r equltJ 12]Lti;al re:;erves 15 ]l
Jl 31.. ]73 2272 269 8 1) :u 0 2197Other .N!~ervea 0 0 0 0 l 51 758 192 129
llt,ta.lned eam.1.np 
0 0 0 911 22 55 0 2 
0 0 50 0 0 100 0loll 0 5 0 459hlt.l-111 ca;.,ttal 0 
27 275 0 2111 II 10 6 2 0 120 12) ll1:r,4.,.a 1n lu.g tera debt 0 0
0 0 0 2250 0 0 0 0 
0 llllJ 119 8 272 n,
3) Dec.N!cwP. or filled uaeta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1500 0 750 0 0(del,Cl"eC1at1"1) 36 II] 86 90] 326 0 0 0 0 1•5 00 119 2 ]1 0 00 ]]'MAL (1 + 2 ♦ 3) 0 3511 6d159 711 ll7 1276 2598ii. L'u:i or l"JJld.:i: Long-Tena 269 0 62 le) ]1 2197 827 7511 1150 dl7Oe:reases l.n debt
Ir::e~:-,,ent 1n flied aneta 
0 9 0 0 i i622 96 0 0 0 00 0 2370 1215 119 650 0ea..1w partlc~Uon + MC\8"1tlae 0 (111) 0 547 1 116 l.5 0 1416 IIS-
0 0 0 
~;~ 37 21 118 0 0 b,7 396 l~0 ;i.;622 (5) 0 21l07 1]32 665 1 
0 0 0 0 1362 0c. ll.c~e 1n Wond.lW Clpltal 116 ~12 119 796 115" 396 1502 5i!SlA-iJ • 1.)-{;) (1163) 79 ll7 (1131)P. Ass~ta (Uses) 1266 (3961 7 (24) (691) (511) 11101 373 3b2 (652) l'll
C&!h a.'"ll depoetta q1i (63)Rec~! ·r~ les 102 1511 
0 (21) ( lj) 49 (8) 3 (l'12) (57)lrr,=-it.;;,rtes 3211 51 19'1 7711 (1117) llj{) 2117 (I)(105) 711 427 m> 1117 (11)
l'J:.U, 
(59) 0 297 52] ]111 (37) 341 211] 0 
lOII 226 107 2SI 7d(159) 11511 (611)•3 36 3211 327 71] 55 b;IE, U...:illltlea (Sourwe) 11111 382 330 1111 (65) 727 1193 212 IIJT 157
Worl-:el'9' depoelta
.:tlCJ't tena~ 0 0 (10) 21
~crallt 332
0 
(39) 0 16 
0 0 0 0 2 22 0
Ottwr 172 (1911) 2011 11152 (577)
0 732 (30) (118) 0 0 (672) . 135 
0 6 0
105 IIOII 1102 llt7 0 UDO (b4) 
10fAL 






506 (311) 20tl 1'511 (550) 11]7 0 2S 03711 :till 111'1 (5) (6711) 51' (21) 1089 (UIS) 
.. 
, .... 





































a. Soun:ea or 1-'1.roo: ~-Tera 
l) lrn:rea.se 1n i;hareholda' eq1&1t7 
i..e•.;u re:.er-11::i 
Otner re:;erve:i 
:'.et a.lrll:d ea.rnlJl9 
Pa.id-in capital 
2) lncrt:a.1e 1n lc.-g tera debt 





























































































W;t,;.. (l + 2 + 3) 1726 2117 121 7031 5757 21 27 31 2102 2370 1621 909 l~l 
B. Uk:. ot ?...-...:i: iaig-'l'enl 
~re....el 1n debt 
1.1..u~Ct:11t 1n r1.uo aaaet. 









































C. Irerease 1n Wor1WC Qip1t.al
( A-a • .>-<;) 




















































































ilot1'ers • deposits 





































































Mllte: 1Uwan Ardlltactual Steel 11d 11:s--. Ar'lttaulte CoW81'1' 11111 Ra11"'011d IU'8 exclt,1ed beoaulle of' data 1nllb1ltty. 
